PMAs and the private rights of men to assemble peacefully, be secure in their persons, papers, effects, and due process of law are protected by the 1st amendment to the Constitution for the United States.
Amendment I
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.
Article 1, section 10, of the Constitution for the United States of America, prohibits Congress from passing any “… law impairing the obligation of contracts.”
In the case of Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906), “… we are of the opinion that there is a clear distinction between an individual and a corporation, and that the latter being a creation of the state has no right to refuse to submit its books and papers for examination at the suit of the state. The individual may stand upon his constitutional rights as a citizen. He is entitled to carry on his private business in his own way. His power to contract is unlimited. He owes no duty to the state or to his neighbors to divulge his business, or to open his doors to investigation, so far as it may tend to criminate him. He owes no such duty to the state, since he receives nothing therefrom, beyond the protection of his life and property. His rights are such as existed by the law of the land long antecedent to the organization of the state, and can only be taken from him by due process of law, and in accordance with the Constitution. Among his rights are a refusal to incriminate himself, and the immunity of himself and his property from arrest or seizure except under a warrant of the law. He owes nothing to the public so long as he does not trespass upon their rights. On the other hand, the corporation is a creature of the state. It is presumed to be created for the benefit of the public. It receives certain special privileges and franchises and holds them subject to the laws of the state and the limitations of its charter. Its powers are limited by law. It can make no contract not authorized by its charter. Its rights to act as a corporation are only preserved to it so long as it obeys the laws of its creation. There is a reserved right in the legislature to investigate its contracts and find out whether it has exceeded its powers. It would be a strange anomaly to hold that a state, having chartered a corporation to make use of certain franchises, could not, in the exercise of its sovereignty, inquire how those franchises have been employed, and whether they had been abused, and demand the production of the corporate books and papers for that purpose.”
Moose Lodge No.107 (Appellant) Vs K.Leroy IRVIS (Appellee), 407 U.S. 163 (1972)
Upon appeal to US Supreme Court, after a lower court decision, Moose Lodge No.107 sought relief from the higher court in regards to public/private determination based on their possession of a State Liquor License. Moose Lodge was at that time a private club, operating outside of the public realm, following a private contract/constitution for members that excluded all persons except white men over the age of 21.
This issue was never in question during 407 U.S. 163. The following are taken from Judge William Rehnquist’s decision unless otherwise noted:
Paragraph 1
Appellee, who had not applied for or been denied membership in appellant private club, had no standing to contest appellant’s membership practices.
Paragraph 20
Moose Lodge is a private club in the ordinary meaning of that term. It is a local chapter of a national fraternal organization having well-defined requirements for membership. It conducts all of its activities in a building that is owned by it. It is not publicly funded. Only members and guests are permitted in any lodge of the order; one may become a guest only by invitation of a member or upon invitation of the house committee.
Paragraph 33
The District Court found that the regulations of the Liquor Control Board adopted pursuant to statute affirmatively require that ‘(e)very club licensee shall adhere to all of the provisions of its Constitution and By-Laws.”. Appellant argues that the purpose of this provision ‘is purely and simply and plainly the prevention of subterfuge, pointing out that the bona fides of a private club, as opposed to a place of public accommodation masquerading as a private club, is a matter with which the State Liquor Control Board may legitimately concern itself. Appellee concedes this to be the case, and expresses disagreement with the District Court on this point. There can be no doubt that the label ‘private club’ can be and has been used to evade both regulations of state and local liquor authorities, and statutes requiring places of public accommodation to serve all persons without regard to race, color, religion, or national origin. This Court in Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 89 S.Ct. 1697, 23 L.Ed.2d 318 (1969), had occasion to address this issue in connection with the application of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 243, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a et seq.
Paragraph 39
Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, with whom Mr. Justice MARSHALL joins, dissenting. “My view of the First Amendment and the related guarantees of the Bill of Rights is that they create a zone of privacy which precludes government from interfering with private clubs or groups The associational rights which our system honors permit all white, all black, all brown, and all yellow clubs to be formed. They also permit all Catholic, all Jewish, or all agnostic clubs to be established. Government may not tell a man or woman who his or her associates must be. The individual can be as selective as he desires. So the fact that the Moose Lodge allows only Caucasians to join or come as guests is constitutionally irrelevant, as is the decision of the Black Muslims to admit to their services only members of their race.”
Paragraph 48
As the first Justice Harlan, dissenting in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 59, 3 S.Ct. 18, 55, 27 L.Ed. 835, said:
‘I agree that government has nothing to do with social, as distinguished from technically legal, rights of individuals. No government ever has brought, or ever can bring, its people into social intercourse against their wishes. Whether one person will permit or maintain social relations with another is a matter with which government has no concern. . . . What I affirm is that no state, nor the officers of any state, nor any corporation or individual wielding power under state authority for the public benefit or the public convenience, can, consistently . . . with the freedom established by the fundamental law . . .discriminate against freemen or citizens, in their civil rights, because of their race . . ..’
Footnote 2
The Pennsylvania courts have found that Local 107 is not a ‘place of public accommodation’ within the terms of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, Pa.Stat.Ann., Tit. 43, § 951 et seq. (1964). Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm’n v. Loyal Order of Moose, Lodge No. 107, Ct.Common Pleas, Dauphin County, 92 Dauph. 234, aff’d, 220 Pa.Super. 356, 286 A.2d 374 (1971)
Footnote 4
The majority asserts that appellee Irvis had ‘standing’ only to challenge Moose Lodge’s guest-service practices, not its membership policies, on the theory that his ‘injury . . . stemmed, not from the lodge’s membership requirements, but from its policies with respect to the serving of guests of members.’